Abstract-We consider the scenario wherein a transmitter Alice wants to (potentially) communicate to the intended receiver Bob over a multipath network, i.e., a network consisting of multiple parallel links, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Willie, who observes an unknown subset of links. A primary goal of our communication protocol is to make the communication "deniable", i.e., Willie should not be able to reliably estimate whether or not Alice is transmitting any covert information to Bob. Moreover, if Alice is indeed actively communicating, her covert messages should be information-theoretically "hidable" in the sense that Willie's observations should not leak any information about Alice's (potential) message to Bob -our notion of hidability is slightly stronger than the notion of informationtheoretic strong secrecy well-studied in the literature. We demonstrate that deniability does not imply either hidability or (weak or strong) information-theoretic secrecy; nor does informationtheoretic secrecy imply deniability. We present matching inner and outer bounds on the capacity for deniable and hidable communication over multipath networks.
to Bob. We assume that Alice and Bob do not share any secret information that is not known to Willie.
In particular, we consider the model wherein Willie is aware of Alice's "innocent" communication patterns (when she is not communicating covertly with Bob). However, due to resource limitations, Willie cannot wiretap on all of Alice's communication links, but only some of them.
Essentially, to be deniable, an active Alice has to look innocent in any subset of her communication links (since she does not know which of her communications might be wiretapped by Willie), i.e., her communication on any subset of channels should be commensurate with her innocent communication pattern. Her covert communication with Bob, then, must be a function of all these channels. The challenge for Alice is to be able to embed meaningful information to Bob on channels which individually look innocent (deniability), and in such a way that Willie can infer absolutely nothing about the covert messages intended for Bob (hidability). In addition, Bob should be able to reliably detect the the presence of covert messages and be able to successfully decode them.
It is important to note that the conventional means of achieving secrecy, like cryptographic security, are not helpful in achieving the goal of deniability. On the contrary, if Willie finds that the data being communicated is encrypted, it can arouse his suspicion that Alice is active.
Similarly, at first glance, it seems that a deniable scheme, which prevents Willie from estimating whether or not Alice is covertly communicating, will inherently be hidable (or secure). However, we demonstrate that deniability and hidability conditions are independent of each other.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we formulate a mathematical model describing Alice's innocent and active communication patterns for a network with multiple parallel paths, referred to as the multipath network. Then, we formally define the notions of reliability, deniability, and hidability. For deniability, we use a hypothesis testing based metric that was introduced in [1] , [2] . Our notion of hidability is similar to the notion of semantic security in [3] and the notion of relaxed perfect secrecy in [4] . In particular, the proposed condition of hidability is slightly stricter than the condition of strong information-theoretic secrecy, hence we use the term hidability rather than secrecy. It can be shown that hidability always guarantees the strong information-theoretic secrecy, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Secondly, we characterize the capacity for reliable and deniable communication over a multipath network (referred to as reliable-deniable capacity). In our achievable strategy, we use random binning to generate the codebook and employ a (one-to-many) stochastic mapping to encode the covert messages. Finally, we characterize the capacity with the added requirement of hidability, and show that the random binning based stochastic encoding can also achieve the reliabledeniable-hidable capacity.
Our information-theoretic techniques enable us to attain separability between the deniable encoding and the hidable encoding. This essentially means that the communication can be made either deniable (but not hidable) or hidable (but not deniable), or both deniable and hidable.
II. RELATED WORK Information-theoretic Secrecy: At first sight, the proposed notion of deniability seem to have significant overlap with the notions of information-theoretic secrecy (see, e.g., [5] , [6] ). However, as we show in this work, the notions of deniability and information-theoretic secrecy/hidability are independent of each other (deniability does not imply either hidability or secrecy, nor is the converse true). The proposed notion of hidability is similar to the notion of semantic security [3] and the notion of relaxed perfect secrecy [4] .
Network Anonymity: Anonymizing protocols such as Tor networks [7] , [8] , enable users to route packets through multiple servers so that it is hard for eavesdroppers to estimate the source or the destination of the traffic. However, the very fact that Alice chooses to route packets through Tor might arouse Willie's suspicion, thus losing the deniability.
Steganography: involves hiding messages into transmitted data such as images. The ideas presented in this paper come close to the information-theoretic steganography framework proposed in [9] , [10] , [11] . However, the main difference is that these steganographic protocols require (large) private keys to be shared between Alice and Bob, unlike our model, which requires no shared secret. However, these steganographic protocols allow the eavesdropper to observe the entire network, while our model imposes restrictions on Willie's observation power.
Other Deniable Protocols: In [1] , [2] , the authors present deniable schemes for AWGN and binary symmetric channel, respectively. In their setup, Alice's innocent communication pattern is to keep quiet (transmit the all-zero codeword), whereas in our model even an innocent Alice does speak. Further, in [2] , the deniability is achieved by exploiting the fact that Willie's channel is noisier than Bob's (thus, hiding the covert data in noise); whereas, we exploit Willie's limited observing power to be deniable (thus, hiding the covert data by coding over different channels). Finally, both [1] and [2] only focus on deniability and not hidability.
Hou and Kramer's work [12] : comes closest to our work. We summarize the key similarities and the differences below.
The notion of effective secrecy proposed by Hou and Kramer essentially combines together the metrics of deniability (referred to as stealth in [12] ) and hidability ( [12] considers strong information-theoretic secrecy). Hou and Kramer consider the generic wiretap channel model. Our model, in which Willie can observe an unknown subset of links, can be considered as a model of an arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) [13] , where the capacity of the channel is a function of the subset that Willie is tapping.
While the capacity result of Hou and Kramer is more general from the perspective of the channel model, we specialize the capacity for deniable and hidable communication for the multipath network channel, and hence our capacity expression is explicitly computed, rather than corresponding to a convex optimization problem over an infinite alphabet.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The transmitter, Alice, uses a multipath network consisting of C parallel links. Each link is assumed to be noiseless and having unit capacity. (See Fig 1.) Alice may or may not wish to communicate covertly with Bob, and accordingly she is said to be in active or in innocent state. An (arbitrary) binary variable T denotes Alice's transmission status, with T = 0 if Alice is innocent, else T = 1. Only Alice knows the value of T a priori. In the innocent state, at each time instant, Alice randomly generates a length-C, binary codeword x according to a distribution p i X (x), defined over an alphabet X := {0, . . . , 2 C −1}, called as the scalar innocent distribution. We assume that the codewords x(t) are i.i.d. over the time instants t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Therefore, the transmitted codeword sequence x ∈ {0, 1} C×n is distributed according to the product distribution p
, called as the innocent distribution, defined over the alphabet X n . In the active state, Alice transmits a covert message m ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nR } to Bob. The covert messages are assumed to be distributed uniformly. Let M be the random variable corresponding m. Alice encodes her covert messages using an encoder Enc : {0, 1} nR × {0, 1} nr → {0, 1} C×n , where r denotes the rate of encoder's private randomness. The distributionp X (.), defined over the alphabet X n , induced by Alice's encoding process is called as the induced distribution.
We say that an encoding scheme is (1 − r )-reliable if, for any arbitrarily small r > 0, Bob's overall probability of error is upper bounded by r . Notice that there are two error events possible: first, Bob cannot correctly estimate T, and second, given that Alice is active, Bob cannot correctly decode m.
The eavesdropper, Willie, observes a subset of links, W ∈ W, where W denotes the class of all possible subsets of links that Willie can observe. For example, W might comprise of all subsets of at most C − 1 links. Let x W ∈ X n W , where X W := {0, . . . , 2 |W| − 1}, be the codeword sequence observed by Willie. The marginal distribution on x W when Alice is innocent (reps. active), denoted as p
, is called as the marginal innocent distribution (resp. marginal induced distribution). We assume that there is no shared secret between Alice and Bob that is not known to Willie. Further, we assume that Willie knows the encodingdecoding scheme used by Alice and Bob.
A communication scheme is said to be deniable if Willie cannot reliably estimate Alice's transmission status. Notice that, to determine the value of the parameter T, Willie essentially performs some binary hypothesis testing. One can show, by standard hypothesis testing arguments [14] , that if the total variation distance (TVD),
, between the marginal distributions under the innocent and the active states is upper bounded by some small d > 0, then Willie's best estimator based on his observations is at most d better than even a naïve estimator independent of his network observations. Therefore, we say that a scheme is
(1) Remark 1. Note that for deniability, one has to bound TVD between the n-letter marginal distributions under the innocent and active states. Any encoding which attempts to match only the single-letter (scalar) marginal distributions may not necessarily be deniable. For hidability, we want Willie to be equally confused about all the covert messages even after observing any codeword x W . Specifically, we say that a scheme is (1 − h )-hidable if, for any arbitrarily small h ∈ [0, 1), we have
for any m ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nR } and ∀W ∈ W. In the following, we discuss these requirements in relation to each other.
A. Deniability vs. Hidability
At first sight, it seems that deniability is a stronger condition than hidability because deniability requires that the transmission status T should be indistinguishable to Willie irrespective of whether he can decode the codewords or not. However, in the following, we show that deniability and hidability are independent of each other.
1) A hidable encoding scheme that is not deniable: Consider a multipath network with C = 2 links, in which Willie can observe either one of the links. Suppose that Alice uses Shannon's one-time padding. Specifically, she transmits a uniform random key sequence on one link and the XOR of the message and the key sequences on the other. It is easy to show that, under this encoding, the ratio given in (2) is always unity, and thus, it is hidable (Recall that one-time pad scheme satisfies the perfect secrecy). However, if the marginal innocent distribution on any of the individual links is not uniform, then this scheme will not be deniable.
2) A deniable encoding scheme that is not hidable: Consider the same network as above. Let the marginal innocent distribution on each individual link be uniform. If the covert messages are uniformly distributed, Alice can use a simple splitter encoder to achieve deniability as follows. First, she splits the length-2n, binary message m into two length-n sequences m 1 and m 2 , i.e., m = [ m 1 , m 2 ]. Then, she transmits the first half of the message over the top link and the second half over the bottom link. Notice that this scheme is perfectly deniable. However, Willie observes half of the message sequence, and thus, this encoding leaks one bit of information to Willie per channel use.
B. Secrecy vs. Hidability
The strong secrecy condition requires that the mutual information between the covert messages and Willie's observations should be bounded, i.e., I M ; X W ≤ , for some small > 0 [5] . It is straightforward to show that, if condition 2 is satisfied for some h = o 1 n , it guarantees that I M ; X W ≤ h [15, Appendix A]. However, the converse is not necessarily true. For example, suppose Alice encodes all her covert messages except one message. If Alice uses some appropriate encoding scheme, like coset coding, the distributions p(m) and p(m| x W ) are close to each other in expectation, and thus, I M ; X W is still bounded. However, this scheme is not hidable since it violates condition (2) for the uncoded message. In fact, as we show in [15, Appendix A], this holds even if Alice ignores to encode a large number of messages (as long as the fraction of uncoded messages is asymptotically small).
IV. RELIABLE AND DENIABLE ENCODER
In this section, we focus on designing schemes that are reliable and deniable, without considering hidability. network is
Converse: We use information-theoretic arguments as follows. Let R d be the deniable rate.
where n → 0 as n → ∞, and (a) follows from Fano's inequality, (b) is due to non-negativity of entropy, (c) is due to the independence bound on entropy, and (d) due to the deniability condition. Achievability: We present a sketch of the proof omitting several details. For complete proofs, we refer the reader to [15] . 
V. RELIABLE, DENIABLE, AND HIDABLE ENCODER
The requirement of hidability in addition to deniability further reduces the covert transmission rate as shown in the following theorem.
